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Colbert

PROSECUTING BALTIMORE POLICE OFFICERS
Douglas L. Colbert*
It is unusual to see a police officer sitting in the courtroom seat
of the criminal defendant and charged with killing a person while on
duty. Even when evidence supports prosecution, officers rarely face
trial.1 Historically, American-style justice deferred to State and local
custom that called for no charges filed, particularly when sheriffs and
police targeted victims included African-Americans, people of color,
the poor, and other subordinated groups.
The past fifty years have seen added processes, such as police
investigations, prosecutors’ review and grand jury action, replace the
virtual automatic immunity given officers but little substantive change
in the outcomes that overwhelmingly protect law enforcement from
prosecution. Today’s decision-makers usually find officers’ deadly
conduct justified and reasonable, including the Cleveland officer who
fired forty-nine shots through a car windshield killing an unarmed
Black couple,2 or they conclude insufficient evidence exists to charge
crimes.3
The Washington Post’s recent national survey confirmed the
infrequency of prosecutors initiating charges when it revealed that of
roughly 10,000 police killings during the 2005–2015 decade, only
fifty-four officers faced prosecution.4 In the rare instance when public
© 2016 Douglas L. Colbert
* Professor of Law, Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author
expresses his appreciation for comments and suggestions offered by Professors
David Jaros and Colin Starger and to the editors of the Journal of Race, Religion,
Gender, and Class for their invitation and valuable assistance.
1
See Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH.
POST (Apr. 11, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-fewprosecuted/ (quoting Philip M. Stinson, a criminologist at Bowling Green who
maintained, “To charge an officer in a fatal shooting, it takes something so
egregious, so over the top that it cannot be explained in any rational way”).
2
Mitch Smith & Ashley Southall, Cleveland Police Officer Acquitted of
Manslaughter in 2012 Deaths, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/us/michael-brelo-cleveland-police-officeracquitted-of-manslaughter-in-2012-deaths.html?_r=0.
3
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Att’y Off. S.D.N.Y, U.S. Attorney’s Office Closes
Investigation into the Death of Ramarley Graham (Mar. 8, 2016) (announcing that
the Southern District of New York lacked sufficient evidence to bring charges
against a NYPD officer for the 2012 death of 18-year-old Ramarley Graham).
4
Kindy & Kelly, supra note 1.
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outcry, protest and mobilization led local officials to initiate
prosecution, police defendants could usually rely on a further
safeguard: being acquitted either by a judge or a predominantly- or allwhite jury.5
That is what first made Baltimore City’s prosecution and
decision to hold the six officers involved in Freddie Gray’s death
accountable this past year a stunning development. In a sense, State’s
Attorney Marilyn Mosby’s decision to prosecute became the 200:1
shot that few in Freddie Gray’s, African-American community could
have expected. Surely, it surprised the police union which had
supported Mosby’s election bid against the incumbent, in part because
they knew she came from a family of officers.6 The union anticipated
Mosby would treat Freddie Gray’s death the same as her predecessors
had done in other alleged police homicides: bring no charges because
no crime had occurred.
Yet, following a series of protests and an uprising that
followed Freddie Gray’s funeral on April 27, 2015, six Baltimore
officers found themselves being processed in Central Booking jail and

5

Id. (indicating national, decade-long data involving 10,000 police killings, 11
officers convicted either by jury or guilty plea); Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-shooting-convictions.us5695968ce4b086c1cd5d0da, concluded “in the rare instances in which they [police]
face charges . . . judges and juries have exhibited a tendency to side with the police.”
D. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge, Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition
Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenge, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 110-117 (allwhite jury’s role and supporting data denying impartial justice to African-American
victims); See Seth Mydans, The Police Verdict; Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted in
Taped Beating, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/02/08/home/rodney-verdict.html (describing how
a venue change led to an absence of African Americans in the jury that acquitted the
LAPD officers accused of brutally beating Rodney King).
6
Mark Puente, Mosby says she learned from mistakes of family members in law
enforcement, BALT. SUN, (July 15, 2015),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-mosby-family20150715-story.html; see Editorial, The FOP’s Offensive Tweets, BALT. SUN, (June
27, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-fop20160627-story.html. In the past, President of BPD’s Union, Lieutenant Gene Ryan,
has referred to protesters as a “lynch mob,” and accused Mosby’s office of
conducting a “malicious” prosecution. Id.
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brought before a city lower court judge.7 The officers faced an
assortment of serious charges including homicide, assault, and
misconduct.8 It was a rare example of a homicide prosecution of onduty officers. Within the past 30 years, only five Baltimore city police
officers faced criminal charges for on-duty killings of civilians.9 Judging
from the union’s vocal and embittered response to the Freddie Gray
prosecutions, they hoped it would be the last one for the next several
decades as well.10
Though no convictions resulted from the four trials held
between December 2015 and June 2016,11 the ground-breaking and
vigorous prosecution came closer to conviction than critics’ pretrial
comments suggested. Indeed, the prosecution’s evidence persuaded
the trial judge that the charges had sufficient merit to bring the cases to
trial and to reach a verdict.12 The cases served notice to officers that in
the future, they could be held liable and face prosecution and
conviction.
I.

BRINGING OF CHARGES

When the State’s Attorney for Baltimore, Marilyn Mosby,
announced the arrests on May 1, 2015 and followed with indictments,
the local prosecutor had done the unthinkable.13 Bypassing the internal
7

Nick Gass, In Swift Move, 6 Police Officers Charged in Freddie Gray’s Death,
POLITICO (May 1, 2015, 10:52 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/freddiegray-death-homicide-baltimore-117551.
8
Id.
9
Doug Donovan and Jean Marbella, Baltimore police rarely charged in deaths
BALT. SUN (May 17, 2015),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-gray-policerare-charges-20150516-story.html. The one officer found guilty had his conviction
overturned on appeal. Id.
10
Noam Scheiber, Police Struggle with Loss of Privileged Position, N.Y. TIMES
(May 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/us/police-struggle-with-loss-ofprivileged-position.html.
11
Trials commenced December 2015 and concluded June 2016.
12
Kevin Rector, Charges Dropped, Freddie Gray Case Concludes with Zero
Convictions Against Officers, BALT. SUN (July 27, 2016, 8:57 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-miller-pretrialmotions-20160727-story.html.
13
Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, 6 Baltimore Police Officers Charged in
Freddie Gray Death, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2015),
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police investigation, which invariably cleared officers of wrongdoing,
she asked her staff to conduct its own investigation with input from the
State Police and city Sheriff.14 While the head of the police
investigation believed the officers committed no crimes and suggested
civil liability would address possible negligence, Mosby’s team
viewed the evidence in a different light.15 Granting testimonial
immunity to some officers overcame their usual obedience to the
infamous code of silence and produced testimony that led grand jurors
to indict and gave prosecutors’ hope for conviction.16
The days, weeks, and months that followed the officers’ arrest
tested Mosby’s prosecutorial resolve. The city’s top prosecutor
incurred the public wrath of the union. Former prosecutors accused
Mosby of incompetence and grandstanding, while defending their
office’s common practice of declining to prosecute a police on-duty
homicide.17 The union called for her removal and the appointment of a
special prosecutor, only months after having vigorously opposed
legislation to create a statewide office to prosecute police

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/us/freddie-gray-autopsy-report-given-tobaltimore-prosecutors.html.
14
Wil Hylton, Baltimore vs. Marilyn Mosby, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/magazine/marilyn-mosby-freddie-graybaltimore.html; Justin Fenton, Baltimore Prosecutors Reached Out to, Did Not Use
State Police in Freddie Gray Investigation, BALT. SUN (July, 29, 2016, 3:11 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-state-policefreddie-gray-20160728-story.html.
15
Justin George, Former Police Commissioner: Mosby “Incompetent” and
“Vindictive”, BALT. SUN (July 27, 2016, 5:35 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-batts-gray20160727-story.html.
16
See Neal Trautman, Police Code of Silence: Facts Revealed, AELE LAW
ENFORCEMENT LEGAL CENTER (2000), http://www.aele.org/loscode2000.html
(maintaining that the code of silence not only exists, but that it will manifest to some
extent among officers in all agencies); Doug Colbert, Opinion, Many Obstacles to
Prosecuting Police, BALT. SUN (July 12, 2015, 10:00 AM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-mosby-colbert-20150713story.html.
17
See, e.g., Michael Biesecker & Ben Nuckols, Experts: Convictions Will Be Tough
to Win in Baltimore Case, HOUS. CHRON. (May 2, 2015),
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/nation-world/nation/article/ExpertsConvictions-will-be-tough-to-win-in-6238794.php (citing criticisms by former
prosecutor Andrew Alperstein).
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misconduct.18 Lawyers for the police moved to transfer the case from
Baltimore to a friendlier county for police defendants.19
None of the defendants’ motions succeeded but they generated
a strong pro-police and anti-Mosby sentiment in op-ed articles and
letters.20 Writers accused Mosby of rushing to judgment, of feeding
her ambition and self-promotion, and of pandering to the AfricanAmerican community. They claimed Mosby’s inexperience and
incompetence resulted in ethical violations when announcing the
arrests. Defense lawyers threatened civil lawsuits, which materialized
months later, and sought court sanctions.21 Media coverage regularly
included critical comments against the prosecution’s case.
I joined the all-too-frequent toxic and one-sided conversation
by providing an alternative perspective, namely that the public interest
is best served by protecting prosecutors’ intention to present evidence
before a Baltimore trial jury, learn what happened to cause Freddie

18

Doug Donovan, FOP Calls on Prosecutor to Recuse Herself, Defends Officers,
BALT. SUN (May 1, 2015, 11:03 AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/sports/bs-mdfop-letter-20150501-story.html.
19
Id.; Wes Bruer, Police Officers in Freddie Gray Case: “Absurd” to Hold Trial in
Baltimore, CNN (July 7, 2015, 7:01 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/07/politics/freddie-gray-police-officers-defense-trial/.
20
See, e.g., Augusta Chron. Editorial Staff, Editorial, An Obvious Overreach,
AUGUSTA CHRON. (May 28, 2016, 12:15 AM),
http://chronicle.augusta.com/opinion/editorials/2016-05-28/obvious-overreach
(suggesting that Mosby was acting as an activist rather than a prosecutor when she
brought charges against the six officers); Graham Rayman, Bratton Says Marilyn
Mosby Overcharged Cops in Freddie Gray Death, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 24,
2016, 12:33 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/bratton-marilynmosby-overcharged-cops-freddie-gray-death-article-1.2648234; Prosecutor
“Overcharged” Baltimore Officers, Local Attorney Says, NPR (May 4, 2015, 4:48
PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/05/04/404236469/prosecutor-overcharged-baltimoreofficers-local-attorney-says; Sean Piccoli, Ex-FBI Official: Baltimore Prosecutor
“Likely” Overcharged Cops, NEWSMAX (May 4, 2015, 8:43 PM),
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsmax-Tv/Ron-Hosko-Orrin-Hudson-Baltimoreindictment/2015/05/04/id/642553/.
21
See Eliott C. McLaughlin & Steve Almasy, Freddie Gray Officers Suing
Prosecutor Marilyn Mosby, CNN (July 28, 2016, 11:52 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/27/us/baltimore-marilyn-mosby-officer-lawsuitsfreddie-gray/ (noting that “the lawsuits allege false arrest, false imprisonment,
defamation or false light, and other assertions.”).
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Gray’s death,22 and allow jurors to decide whether an officer should be
held criminally responsible for failing to seatbelt, safeguard, and
provide medical attention for an arrestee.23 As the public viewed the
video of Freddie Gray being dragged and apparently injured before
entering the van, the transparency of a public trial became an
imperative to allow the community to judge whether the evidence
supported conviction.
II.

THE TRIALS: OFFICER WILLIAM PORTER

I attended almost every moment of the four separate police
trials, which began on November 30, 2015 with that of Officer
William Porter, a 28-year-old African American and lifetime city
resident. Initially, the prosecuting attorneys planned to conduct multidefendant, consolidated trials which judges generally prefer over
individual trials because of cost and judicial economy. When the
judge denied the prosecution motion to try Porter with two other
officers and granted separate trials for each of the six defendants, the
prosecutors’ interest turned to the order of the trials and they opted to
try Officer Porter first. Typically, judges defer to the prosecution’s
strategy and suggested placement of defendants.
Officer Porter had responded to the police “bikers’” call for
assistance. Upon arrival, Porter observed a cuffed and shackled
Freddie Gray on the ground outside the van with officers then carrying
a “hog-tied” Gray inside and onto the floor. Three stops later, Officer
Porter answered the van driver’s call to check on Gray. Entering
through the rear door, Porter approached a weakened Freddie Gray
lying face down. Gray answered “yes” when Officer Porter asked
whether he needed medical assistance. Porter never called for a medic
or fastened Gray’s seat belt. When Officer Porter left the van, he
placed Gray on the prisoner’s bench unbelted and without restraints.
22

Colbert, supra note 16. Police supporters’ effort to influence public opinion
included suggestions that Gray self-inflicted the injuries or they resulted from lead
paint poisoning as a child.
23
See Jennifer Ludden, Questions in the Freddie Gray Case – And Answers from the
Ongoing Trial, NPR (Dec. 8, 2015, 4:21 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2015/12/08/458950280/why-didn-t-officer-call-medic-forfreddie-gray-and-other-questions (quoting Officer Porter, who explained at trial that
the back of the van was a tight space which made seat-belting suspects exceedingly
dangerous).
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At trial, Porter chose to be tried by a twelve-person Baltimore
jury rather than a bench trial with the judge, who subsequently would
try the next three defendants. The multi-racial jury that eventually
deliberated included six Black and six White jurors. From the defense
perspective, a jury made good sense. Defense lawyers generally
believe that it is easier to find one juror with reasonable doubt than it
is to persuade a single judge to get it right.
Officer Porter’s trial differed from that of his co-defendants
because he chose to testify. Porter had given extensive statements to
two investigating detectives and his 30-minute video interview
included damaging evidence that required explanation. Porter’s trial
testimony deviated and appeared inconsistent from what he previously
told the detectives.
First, a female detective testified speaking to Porter and being
told Freddie Gray uttered, “I cannot breathe” at stop four when Porter
checked his condition. If true, that would have alerted Porter to the
necessity of medical aid. At trial, Porter rejected the detective’s
account. He testified hearing these words at the first stop before seeing
Gray shackled outside the van.
Second, an interrogating detective questioned Porter about not
calling for a medic after hearing Gray say he wanted one and seeing
Gray’s head slumped onto Gray’s shoulder. Porter told the detective
that waiting for the medic would take too long and thought it faster for
the van driver to take him for medical care. At trial, Porter testified to
finding no signs of Gray’s injury that required immediate medical
care.
Third, the same interrogating detective asked why Porter had
not fastened Gray’s seat belt. Porter referred to the police practice of
not doing so but never mentioned being in too tight a space or in fear
of Gray. That made sense since Porter had told the detective he stood
inches from Gray when helping him stand and positioning him onto a
bench. At trial, Porter modified his response, saying police always
worry about the danger of prisoners taking the officer’s weapon or
spitting when placing themselves in close proximity, and gave that
reason for not belting Gray in.
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Lastly, the investigating detective suggested Freddie Gray was
in a non-threatening condition because of his severe neck injury and
that Porter could have belted Gray in safely. At trial, Porter described
Freddie Gray able to lift himself with minimal assistance, a version
consistent with the defense theory that Gray’s broken neck occurred
afterwards.
The jury wrestled with these inconsistencies and with conflicting
witness testimony. Jurors deliberated from Monday afternoon to late
Wednesday afternoon when they returned with non-unanimous
verdicts on the four charges, which resulted in a mistrial. While most
media regarded the mistrial a defense victory, the prosecution had
come very close to convicting the officer on two charges. According to
the Baltimore Sun’s account, the jury voted 10-1 to convict on the
“Official Misconduct” charge and agreed by a 7-3 majority to convict
on Reckless Endangerment. 24 Jurors evenly divided on a third charge
and 11 jurors would have acquitted on Reckless Manslaughter.25 The
Judge declared a mistrial two days after deliberation began. 26 A juror
thought the jury might have reached unanimity had it deliberated
further.27
III.

POLICE PROSECUTIONS: A SYNOPSIS

I witnessed the Baltimore State’s Attorney Office prosecute
three other defendants at separate trials: Officers Nero and Goodson
and Lieutenant Rice. However, before the first of these trials began,
the rare intervention of an appeals court caused an unexpected delay.
Officer Nero’s trial would commence four months later.
Following the Porter mistrial, the prosecution asked to retry
Officer Porter before moving to the trials of his five co-defendants.
From the outset, the prosecution’s theory had focused upon convicting
Porter and encouraging his cooperation as a witness against the other
officers. The Judge, though, rejected the request and placed Porter at
24

Kevin Rector & Justin Fenton, Jury in Officer Porter Trial Was One Vote from
Acquittal on Most Serious Charge, BALT. SUN (Jan. 16, 2016, 3:46 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-porter-jurysplit-20160115-story.html.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
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the end of the queue. Doing so created a major hole in the prosecution
strategy of trying its strongest case first and gaining the cooperation of
a convicted defendant.
The court’s rejection of Porter’s retrial led to two court rulings
regarding the prosecution’s power to grant witness immunity and
compel testimony, as long as it protects the witness’ privilege against
self-incrimination by prohibiting prosecutors from using the testimony
at their trial. Following Maryland procedure, the first ruling granted
immunity to Officer Porter; the court, however, denied prosecutors
giving immunity to “biker” Officer Miller by questioning the
prosecution’s good faith. Not surprisingly, the defense appealed the
Porter ruling and the prosecution followed by appealing the trial
judge’s Miller decision. Because witness immunity is a well-settled
issue that could be readily decided, it remained puzzling why the
appellate court ordered oral argument rather than ruling on the
motions. The resulting delay from January to April caused a sudden
halt to the prosecution’s momentum after it had nearly convicted
Officer Porter.
When the appellate court predictably overruled the trial court’s
denial of witness immunity, the parties returned to trial. From that
point forward, the mood appeared to shift in the courtroom and a
series of unpleasant and contentious exchanges unfolded between the
judge and the prosecuting attorneys. Observers are not privy to what
is said at bench conferences and it is not certain what caused the
atmospheric change, but subsequent rulings favored the defense. Even
relatively straightforward matters, such as the prosecutor’s proposed
order for trying the remaining defendants – a matter usually honored
absent a showing of prejudice or inconvenience – became a
battleground. The judge openly questioned the prosecution’s
credibility for seeking witness immunity, and subsequently denied
prosecutors preferred order. Officer Nero’s trial would proceed next,
followed by van driver Goodson, supervising Lieutenant Rice, Officer
“biker” Miller, and Sergeant White, who checked Freddie Gray’s
condition at stop five.
IV.

OFFICERS NERO AND GOODSON AND LIEUTENANT RICE

The prosecution could not have been pleased with the Judge
moving Officer Nero to the first position following the Porter mistrial.
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Originally, he was placed in the next-to-last position. Officer Nero and
his partner, Officer Miller, both young, White and relatively new to
the force, were two of the three “biker” officers who responded to
their supervising officer, Lieutenant Rice’s, call for assistance. Officer
Miller, testifying under immunity, assumed the primary role of
chasing and apprehending Gray; a video showed Miller kneeing him in
the back as Gray lay face down on the ground. Nero’s passive role as
the back-up officer amounted to protecting Miller against a potential
escape and assisting to lift Gray onto the van.
From the defense perspective, Officer Nero’s choice of being
tried before Judge Williams and not a trial jury made sense. Nero’s
trial involved issues of law, namely how would the “reasonable”
officer have acted, and whether the officer received timely notice of
the Police Commissioner’s mandate that transported prisoners be
belted in. The defense lawyers preferred these issues to be decided by
a judge rather than a jury. Though a judicial fact-finder could infer that
Nero was aware Freddie Gray needed medical care and required a
fastened seat belt per the Police Commissioner’s prior orders, evidence
of his limited involvement and contrary expert opinions likely explain
the Judge’s finding that the prosecution had failed to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also appeared unimpressed with
the prosecution’s theory of assault that involved Officer Nero’s
unauthorized touching during Gray’s arrest.
Following the court’s acquittal of Officer Nero, the public
waited for what they considered the prosecutor’s strongest case – that
of the van driver, Cesar Goodson, a veteran African-American officer.
Goodson had been identified by other officers and defense lawyers as
the person responsible for prisoner care. At his trial, however,
Goodson’s lawyers shifted responsibility to commanding officer,
Lieutenant Rice.
Among the defendants, Officer Goodson faced the most serious
charge – causing a person’s death because of a wanton and reckless
indifference to human life along with other crimes. While critics
accused prosecutors of overcharging, the evidence presented could
have led a fact-finder to conclude the officer showed a blatant lack of
concern for Gray’s life or well-being. Charging the more serious
“wanton indifference” homicide also permitted a fact-finder to convict
on the lesser reckless manslaughter crime that required an “awareness”
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and “conscious disregard of the substantial risk of death or serious
injury.”
The
prosecution’s
testimony established
Goodson’s
responsibility to protect and care for prisoners, to search prisoners for
weapons before entering the van, to question the prisoner and learn the
extent of his injuries, and to ensure the custodial prisoner’s safety
during transport. The video evidence showed Goodson failed to take
any of these actions: he never entered the van, never spoke to Freddie
Gray, never conducted a search, and never asked whether Gray needed
a medic. Indeed, aside from when he approached to close the van
doors, Goodson consistently remained outside and at a substantial
distance from Freddie Gray’s prone position. Officer Goodson allowed
the arresting officers to enter and place a restrained Gray face down on
the metal floor, his head inches from hitting the metal wall. Even after
calling for police assistance, Goodson stayed at a distance where he
could not hear Porter’s conversation or observe Gray. Might a
reasonable fact-finder conclude that Goodson’s indifference to Gray’s
condition and failure to fulfill his duty to protect his prisoner represent
a wanton disregard for human life? Might the fact-finder conclude
that the officer’s awareness of the substantial risk and conscious
disregard of Gray’s injuries and plea for medical help, even after
Porter reported to him following his examination, amount to reckless
manslaughter? Goodson declined to fasten Gray’s seat belt during the
remaining drive.
The presiding judge’s lengthy and detailed ruling concluded
that the prosecution failed to present sufficient direct evidence to
establish Officer Goodson’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on any of
the charges. He emphasized that the prosecution had presented
insufficient proof of a “rough ride” to establish the wanton
indifference or simple recklessness required for manslaughter. The
Judge found Officer Goodson not guilty.
Lieutenant Rice, an experienced, White police officer with
eighteen years on the city’s force stood trial next. Indeed, he would be
the fourth and last defendant to be tried. The trial testimony revealed
his role as the officer-in-charge. Indeed, it was he who set the wheels
in motion when he saw Gray running, followed after him by bicycle,
and ordered Miller and Nero to apprehend and arrest him. The
lieutenant supervised several officers shackling, cuffing and lifting
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Gray onto the van. Lieutenant Rice climbed inside and remained there
for only eleven seconds before leaving and without protecting Gray
against serious harm. At the next stop, the lieutenant ordered Gray to
be removed from the van so that his cuffs and shackles could be
replaced, following which he was returned to the same position on the
van floor. A fact-finder could conclude that the lieutenant appeared
indifferent to Freddie Gray’s health and well-being, that the veteran
commanding officer was aware of the Police Commissioner’s
directives and disregarded his duty to care for the prisoner and to
fasten the seat belt. At no time did the lieutenant order his
subordinates to take Gray for medical help or to safeguard him.
The Judge again found that the prosecution failed to present
sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt and concluded he was not guilty.
CONCLUSION
Following the court’s third acquittal, State’s Attorney Marilyn
Mosby conceded the same result would likely follow against the
remaining defendants and correctly dismissed the charges against
Officers Miller and Porter and Sargent Alicia White. While the
prosecutor’s decision reflected that reality, the trials of the officers
charged with the death of Freddy Gray served the public interest.
Contrary to critics’ repeated charge that the prosecutions had been
politically motivated and unwarranted, the prosecution presented much
stronger evidence than the public had been led to believe. The trial
judge, too, agreed that the evidence warranted a jury’s or judge’s
verdict. Indeed, the State’s Attorney’s ethical duty to seek justice for
Freddy Gray and the public community required nothing less than a
committed prosecution. Consider, too, the deliberations of the multiracial Baltimore jury, which overwhelmingly agreed to convict on one
charge and decisively favored conviction on a second offense. One
need not speculate whether additional deliberation might have resulted
in a unanimous verdict to appreciate that ordinary citizens concluded
crimes had occurred. Had jurors rather than a judge heard the
evidence, they may have come to a different conclusion and found a
sufficient factual and legal basis to convict Officer Goodson,
Lieutenant Rice, and Officer Porter on retrial.
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The public trials of the officers criminally charged with the
death of Freddie Gray while in police custody served other important
purposes, too. The trial educated the public about police practices. It
enhanced public understanding about the legal system’s requirements
and the way it protects some who are accused of crime and others who
are victims of crime. Providing access to open trial courtrooms
allowed people to hear a more complete version of events, and made it
easier for the African-American community to accept the verdicts
without a violent reaction, as media reported and some feared. Public
trials revealed the deficiencies and areas needing immediate reform to
reduce the likelihood of someone else dying in police custody. In
matters of high public interest, televising trials would educate more
people about the prosecution’s determined effort to convict and the
strong defense offered by the police defendants.
The prosecution of six Baltimore police officers provided a
rare glimpse into police practices in the city’s African-American,
Sandtown-Winchester community where Freddie Gray lived. The
policing of people of color and low-income and impoverished
neighborhoods is remarkably different than the policing taking place
in Baltimore’s upscale and predominantly white neighborhoods. In
privileged Baltimore, white men not engaged in criminal activity may
run on a quiet Sunday morning with police in the area without fearing
that the police will chase, capture, and physically injure them. The
privileged cannot imagine what they could do that would lead to
officers pursuing them on bikes—that would lead to being tackled,
cuffed, dragged, and shackled—and being “hog-tied” on the metal
floor of a moving vehicle without means of protection from banging
against the metal walls during a 45-minute car ride. Freddie Gray
knew. Maybe that explains why he ran away from officers after
previous encounters.
Freddie Gray was not the only vocal person heard screaming
for help. People could be heard on videos objecting loudly to police
actions. On talk shows, retired officers expressed shame for the way
Gray was treated and their voices must be heard, too. For future
prosecutions to succeed, the entire Baltimore community must call for
the end of the police code of silence and support the many professional
officers willing to step forward as witnesses. Officers must protect
prisoners in custody, and intervene when their brother and sister
officers participate in conduct that jeopardizes prisoners’ safety or
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results in violent “attitude” arrests and unsafe police rides. Every
person taken into custody deserves humane treatment.
Bringing homicide and criminal charges against police officers
happens infrequently. Some say that is because the police act properly
and only use deadly force when justified and necessary. The recent
Department of Justice report says otherwise.28 It suggests a police
culture where some officers regularly violate people’s rights with
impunity from punishment. When police internal investigations appear
to tolerate police criminality, the public loses faith in impartial justice
and rejects the official version of what happened. To gain public
support when police are unfairly accused, the people must see and hear
for themselves if they are to accept the no-prosecution or not guilty
outcome. Transparency also helps ensure that officers who do wrong
or commit crime are held accountable in order to deter others.
The police defendants received a good defense and fair trials.
Freddie Gray suffered a tragic, painful, brutal and unnecessary death.
State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby declared after the last trial that
substantial change must occur or the same outcomes – acquittals and
mistrials – will follow.29
The State’s Attorney and Police Commissioner Kevin Davis
can point to many positive improvements since Gray’s death. Police
installed cameras in vans and on officers, and enhanced training and
communication of command orders would have provided the Gray
prosecutors with much needed trial evidence.30 The State’s Attorney’s
call for citizens’ participation during investigations and on disciplinary
boards should further community cooperation.

28

See CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (Aug. 10, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/883366/download (reporting that the “BPD engages
in a pattern or practice of conduct that violates the Constitution or federal law.”).
29
Hylton, supra note 14.
30
Kevin Rector, Baltimore Police Rolling Out Transport Vans with Cameras,
Redesigned Interiors, WASH. POST (June 1, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/baltimore-police-rolling-outtransport-vans-with-cameras-redesigned-interiors/2016/05/31/9fbdceee-2776-11e6a3c4-0724e8e24f3f_story.html#comments.
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Law enforcement officials must go farther, and find concrete
ways to build community trust and partnership. When that happens,
the police and prosecution can expect mutual respect and cooperation
from witnesses needed to convict wrongdoers. The community, too,
will gain important allies in meeting their safety needs. Together, they
can forge a partnership to address real structural reform and
overlooked economic, educational, health care, and equal justice
needs.

